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Labeling ‘‘Genocide’’ in Sudan: A
Constructionist Analysis of Darfur
William F.S. Miles
Department of Political Science, Northeastern University and
The Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University
Labeling is critical for the framing, perception, and political implications of social
problems, genocide being a critical but overlooked example. For half a century
social-science theory has developed increasingly sophisticated paradigms for
understanding the process by which problems are recognized and addressed:
social constructionism, labeling theory, politico-linguistics, problem definition, and
tipping points. Yet rarely have these theoretical frameworks been applied to
genocide studies. When reconsidered in light of Sudan, these general frameworks
validate the constructionist argument that the recognized severity of political
problems—including government-organized or -sanctioned mass killings—is a
function of the socio-linguistic processing and naming of them. Anti-genocide
advocates, no less than scholars of genocide, can benefit from the adaptation and
application of policy frameworks deriving from constructionist analysis. The article
concludes with empirical data tracing the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ in the print
media with respect to Darfur.

Labeling Darfur ‘‘Genocide’’
Recent events in Sudan have revealed that the longer the Darfur conflict goes on,
the more it takes on an awful complexity, for which the notion of genocide may be too
dangerously simple.
—Lydia Polgreen, writing in The New York Times, 23 July 20061

For humanists sympathizing with the plight of innocent victims of African civil strife,
the question of whether or not to label the violence ‘‘genocide’’ is irrelevant. Killing is
killing, goes this line of thinking, and debating whether the mass killing in question
fits a purist’s definition of genocide is a callous exercise in semantics.
In the news article from which this essay’s epigraph is extracted, the journalist
focuses on two dying infants, one in Congo and the other in Darfur. The infant boy in
Darfur, who has pneumonia, eventually survives, thanks to the rudimentary health
services provided through international relief agencies. In Congo, the prognosis for the
barely breathing, ‘‘stick-thin’’ baby girl is grim. The inferred reason? The conflict in
Darfur has been labeled ‘‘genocide,’’ triggering humanitarian responses; mass violence
in the Congo, where the toll in innocent human life has been much greater than in
Darfur, has not been similarly registered in the world’s consciousness. As a result, the
sufferings of its population have been ignored. Whether the term ‘‘genocide’’ is applied
to individual theaters of violence, then, has life-and-death implications for non-combat
casualties. As the Times article also conveys, however, the determination of genocide
for a given conflict is not immutable: a recognition of genocide in Darfur in 2004 may,
by 2006, be undermined by fatal fighting within the erstwhile camps of both
perpetrators and victims.
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The media constitute one avenue for public consciousness of genocidal crises.
Diplomacy constitutes another. Both avenues, however, are two-way: both provide
contradictory answers to the question, ‘‘Is this a genocide?’’ Five months after US
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s September 2004 recognition of an ongoing genocide in
the Darfur region of Sudan, for example, the UN Security Council determined that
conflict there did not in fact rise to the level of genocide. To complicate matters further,
the State Department itself has sent mixed messages: in April 2005, Deputy Secretary
of State Robert Zoellick, during a trip to the capital of Sudan, held back when asked to
reaffirm his own department’s finding of genocide.
Political and legal factors played a role in this discrepancy. On the political side,
in the wake of the widely condemned US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq,
the international community was reluctant to follow the American lead in endorsing
a State Department finding that logically led to justifying another intervention.
From a legal perspective, a finding of genocide required evidence of actual intent by the
government of Sudan to destroy, in whole or in part, the inhabitants of western Sudan.
In the absence of incriminating documentation (and such is difficult to obtain, even
if perpetrators are brazen enough to commit their genocidal aims to paper), intent is
a difficult criterion to establish. International lawyers may be comfortable with
inferring intent from facts on the ground; diplomats in as highly politically charged
a chamber as the United States are less so.
The vagaries of politics influence but do not completely determine the framing
of issues and the application of terminology that triggers action. For half a century,
social-science theory has developed increasingly sophisticated paradigms for understanding the process by which problems are recognized and addressed. Framing
overseas conflicts as genocide has not, however, been a subject of this literature.
This article therefore examines the social-scientific dimensions of the competing and
contradictory findings with respect to Darfur.
Labeling the violence in Darfur as ‘‘genocide’’—or not so labeling it—has great
relevance for theories that have been well developed in the areas of epistemological
theory and American politics (including criminology) but rarely applied to comparative
and international politics. In terms of constructionism, labeling theory, agenda setting,
and problem definition, application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ has immense social import
that redounds on political calculations of intervention. As the contrast in responses
to Congo and Darfur illustrates, when these abstractions are distilled, they do have
life-and-death consequences for, inter alia, infants in Africa.

What Is Genocide?
Before tackling application of the term ‘‘genocide’’ to instances of mass political
violence, we need note that there is far from unanimity about its core definition.2
Much of the scholarly contribution in this domain has been a pushback against the
standard United Nations definition (derived from the work of Rafael Lemkin;
see below), which emphasizes only the ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion of a
victimized group. In an effort to achieve Cold War consensus, the UN conception
of genocide pointedly omitted political ideology or affiliation of a targeted group
as warranting an international indictment of genocide.
In response, Leo Kuper emphasizes the validity of political affiliation as a category
of victimhood.3 He also brings a sensitivity to genocidal crimes that occur under the
aegis of colonial rule. Helen Fein, also bristling from definitional restrictiveness,
emphasizes that the essence of genocide lies in its targeting of a human collectivity,
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regardless of supposed primordial identity.4 Roger Smith has long asserted that not
only the targeted group but all humankind is a victim when genocide is committed on
part of its universal body.5
Another pioneer in genocide studies, I.L. Horowitz, shifts the focus to the identity
of the perpetrator—in his view, the death-promoting state.6 Frank Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn also look to the perpetrator as the definer of the group slated for
extermination.7
So as to highlight the insufficiency of the single term genocide, other scholars have
proposed more specific terminology: democide,8 politicide,9 ethnocide.10 Both Ervin
Staub and Israel Charny, as befitting their professional disciplines, infuse their
etiological treatments of the ‘‘ultimate evil’’ from the perspective of psychology.11
Despite variation in definition, emphasis, and terminology, scholars seem to
recognize genocide when variations of it unfold ignominiously on the global scene. Less
clear is the extent to which the concept of genocide has penetrated the conceptual and
normative frameworks of ordinary citizens in democratic societies. For it is their
cognition of genocide that, ultimately, determines their governments’ disposition to
take action against it.

The Construction of Constructionism
The notion that naming an object or phenomenon imparts to it a reality it did not
previously possess harks back to the early empiricists, most prominently George
Berkeley (1685–1753).12 Berkeley’s subjective idealism created an epistemological
foundation which Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann would extend more broadly to
social reality writ large.13 Knowledge structures reality, Berger and Luckmann
argued, but the ways in which we gain knowledge are themselves a function of social
framing. Conceptualizing the Holocaust as it was unfolding, for instance, was made
immensely difficult by the absence of a socially recognized precedent. (When
confronted with first-hand evidence from concentration camp witness Jan Karski,
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter is reported to have said, ‘‘I don’t believe
you . . . I do not mean that you are lying. I simply said I cannot believe you.’’14) Since
the Shoah, our social knowledge has rendered representations of genocide all too
believable.
Concurrent with Berger and Luckmann’s sociological formulation of constructionism, H.S. Becker was advancing a parallel theory within the sub-field of social
deviance and criminology. ‘‘Deviance,’’ according to Becker, ‘‘is not a quality of the act a
person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and
sanctions to an ‘offender.’ ’’15 A reprehensible act is not a ‘‘crime’’ until society (usually
through its legal system) so defines it. By the same logic, repeated homicide—even
serial or mass murder—cannot be considered genocidal until society at large (1) has
incorporated the concept of genocide (social constructionism) and (2) is able to identify
perpetrators as ge´nocidaires (a term arising from 1994 Rwanda).
By focusing on the symbols and language of political discourse, Murray Edelman
transferred the philosophical and sociological foundations of constructionism to the
realm of political science. In his earliest elaboration, Edelman argued that language,
handmaiden to the actual needs of citizens, itself forms political reality and behavior:
‘‘concepts become meaningful when they are related to people’s affective demands.’’16
Edelman returned to this theme in his work devoted to political language per se: ‘‘It is
language about political events rather than the events themselves that everyone
experiences.’’17 With respect to our concern here, relatively few individuals are
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witnesses to mass killings; we are informed about them through words and images
(which are themselves commented upon). Whether or not the language describing
mass killings invokes the term ‘‘genocide’’ influences our responses to the information.
As harbinger to the school of problem definition, Edelman later maintained that,
in the realm of politics, conflicts have no independent status apart from the context
in which they are embedded and discussed. He also intimates a hierarchy of concern
that is also constructed. More specifically, he states that ‘‘problems come into discourse
and therefore into existence as reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because
they are there or because they are important for wellbeing . . . [T]hey create beliefs
about the relative importance of events and objects.’’18 If one conflict (Darfur)
is mentally assimilated with a recognized genocide (Rwanda), the response goes one
way; if no such structured connection is made (Congo), it goes another.
Edelman was well aware of the corrupting possibilities that follow from the power
to define. If, as argued here, it is critical in the social arena for public opinion shapers
and policy makers to be able to label specific patterns of violence as genocides, it is no
less true that other elites wield the power to justify genocide:
One of the most frequent recurring forms of political categorization is the definition of
some large group of people as so serious a threat that their physical existence, their
most characteristic ways of thought and feeling, or both must be exterminated or
ruthlessly repressed.19

Indeed, labeling theory has not adequately addressed the paradox that not only the
marginal and stigmatized are, according to the perpetrators, ‘‘deviants’’: in some
conditions, the labelers themselves, acting on behalf of society, become the morally
deviant.20 Nazi and Hutu Power leaders had the power to label Jews and Tutsis,
respectively, as ‘‘vermin’’ and ‘‘cockroaches.’’ Those sets of labels produced lethal
realities; the labelers were criminals of the highest order.

Problem Definition
With problem definition, constructionism moves from phenomenology and sociolinguistics to agenda setting.21 International applications, however, are few and far
between.22 In the scholarly literature, linkages to genocide studies are even scarcer;
one notable exception is Herbert Hirsch’s outline of a general strategy for getting
genocide on the agenda of the US presidency and Congress.23
Problem definition recognizes that political language helps determine which issues
rise to the consciousness and agendas of policy makers.24 Yet there are other factors as
well. These other factors have implications for the recognition of genocide, and for
subsequent possibilities of intervention.
Politics, particularly in democratic polities, is characterized by a multiplicity
of groups competing for government action related to their respective causes. Problem
definition strives, in general, to explain what makes a public issue a matter
of governmental interest and possible action. (A sub-theme asks what keeps an issue
off the problem-solving agenda.25) Most problem-definition research to date has
focused on domestic agenda setting: homelessness, AIDS, drug abuse, sexual
harassment, pollution. Yet the framework can be adapted to asking, How is this
one problem in Africa (i.e., Darfur) defined to make it an issue for intergovernmental
interest and action? Three aspects of problem definition are of particular relevance
to our case at hand: problem ownership, crisis, and solution.
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Problem Ownership
The term ‘‘problem ownership’’ refers to the identification of a recognized authority
or authorities to define an issue. (This is often referred to as the ‘‘community of
operatives.’’) When it comes to international conflict, such as characterizes Sudan,
there exists a host of competing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that not
only have separate institutional agendas but rarely have the opportunity to interact
directly. In this case, competing NGOs include human-rights organizations
(Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, the Coalition for International
Justice, the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human
Rights); multinational organizations (especially the less-than-expeditious United
Nations); diplomatic missions (with the US Agency for International Aid, for instance,
not necessarily seeing eye to eye with the State Department); and academics
(the Institute for the Study of Genocide, the International Association of Genocide
Scholars, the European Network of Genocide Studies). The freedom of such
disparate organizations to apply different standards (not to mention definitions) of
genocide aggravates the state of problem ownership. When, as here, different
governments and human-rights organizations disagree about labeling the crisis in
Darfur as genocide, the resultant confusion in problem ownership militates against
international action.

Crisis
When does a ‘‘problem’’ (a matter of concern but not necessarily action) get elevated
to the status of ‘‘crisis’’ (a concern that calls forth for action)? Echoing Edelman,
students of problem definition point to a ‘‘rhetoric of calamity’’ that betokens
a qualitative shift from problem to crisis. In the case of Sudan, it is noteworthy
that a much longer series of repressive military campaigns in the south, with
unmistakable ethnic and religious overtones (an Arab-speaking Muslim government
based in Khartoum versus Christian and animist black Africans in the South),
and resulting in many more civilian casualties, has not been elevated, in public
consciousness and US governmental notice, to a similar level of genocidal concern.
In a word, why Darfur and not the Dinka?
The Dinka, along with the Nuba, have long been recognized within the literature
of genocide. Ted Gurr identify them as a people ‘‘at risk.’’26 As early as 1981, Kuper
wrote of their being subject to ‘‘many episodes of genocidal massacre.’’27 The entry
for Sudan in Charney’s authoritative Encyclopedia of Genocide explicitly acknowledges the genocide in southern Sudan. That Darfur has captured the attention of
the American and international community in a way that the destruction of the Nuba
and Dinka has not speaks to the critically important, and constructed, nature
of problem elevation to ‘‘crisis’’ status.28

Solution
Somewhat counterintuitively, problem-definition theory makes a strong case that
solutions help define the problem: governments are reluctant to add items to their
constantly filled agenda unless there is a plausible solution linked to the problem as
defined.
The US State Department’s unilateral finding of ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur speaks to
the risky nature of such a finding. What solution followed from this definition
of the problem, a definition that would be tacitly refuted by other governments and
by the United Nations itself ? In his declaration of findings, Secretary of State Powell
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was careful to deny that the finding demanded specific action on the part of his
government. Implicitly, his public definition of the Darfur problem undercut the usual
premise of an embedded solution.
From a US perspective, possible solutions to the Darfur problem included
sanctions against the Khartoum government; the establishment of a no-flight zone;
equipping, training, and transporting sufficient numbers of troops supplied by the
African Union; and direct intervention. In a post–Iraq invasion context in which the
usefulness of international sanctions had already been denigrated, and with the Iraqi
insurgency capturing a great portion of the foreign-relations agenda, these otherwise
reasonable solutions were off the table. Defining the situation in Darfur as a genocide
at a time when solutions to that problem were relatively unlikely undercut the
possibility of action. At the same time, it underscored the significance of embedding
solutions within problem definition.

Tipping Point
Although not yet included within the canon of scholarship, the perspective of ‘‘tipping
points,’’ as elaborated by Malcolm Gladwell, is relevant to this constructionist analysis
of genocide in Sudan.29 The notion of the tipping point—the ways in which an idea
or product captures the imagination of the public at large—broadens the inquiry into
the perception of genocide in Darfur from policy makers and other elites to that of
mass publics.
The question here is not only how, when, and why Darfur captured the
imagination of the American public as a genocide. That question can be easily,
if superficially, dispensed with by invocation of the ‘‘CNN effect,’’ or, less ephemeral,
the impact of the cover photo and story of Time magazine on 4 October 2004.
More significant is the popular spread of the idea that America must eradicate
genocide. That perspective, as Samantha Power illustrates, has been the antithesis
of American foreign policy beginning with the Armenian Genocide of 1915.30 As with
Jeffrey Sachs’s campaign to eradicate world poverty,31 with Darfur genocide
prevention has risen to the cusp of a tipping point in public consciousness
(and conscience). With contested views as to its actual status as genocide, however,
that threshold is not likely to be mounted soon.

Contesting the Label
The decision to label the violence in Darfur as genocide took on political overtones
when the US Congress passed a resolution to that effect in July 2004. One month
before, during a fact-finding trip to Sudan, the secretary of state had been asked
if genocide was occurring in Darfur. His response unwittingly evoked the importance
of labeling theory: ‘‘What we are seeing is a disaster, a catastrophe, and we can
find the right label for it later.’’ Powell’s tone of voice was dismissive, suggesting
that the question was a mere semantic problem. He did, however, add that, ‘‘regardless
of the words used to describe what is happening in Darfur, we are acting with
the utmost sense of urgency.’’
That ‘‘sense of urgency’’ became apparent only the following September, however,
when Powell endorsed the State Department’s Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT)
finding that the violence in Darfur did in fact constitute genocide. Powell’s declaration
was historic and unprecedented, in that it was the first time the executive branch
of the United States formally acknowledged the existence of a genocide, not
retroactively, but while it was ongoing.32
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Subsequent declarations by other governments departing from the ADT and
State Department (see Table 1) prompted international debate over what genocide
actually is. With the contrary finding of the UN’s International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur (COI), that debate took on ever more problematic dimensions.
On 25 January 2005, the COI, in its report to Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
‘‘concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.’’
Annan’s follow-up (and lengthy) report to the Security Council (31 January) avoided
the word entirely.33
Certainly, the COI did pointedly speak of ‘‘gross violations of human rights
perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control.’’ It also
admitted the possibility of Sudanese government officials’ ‘‘commit[ing] acts with
genocidal intent.’’ However, the killings and displacements of indigenes of Darfur
did not—using the language of the relevant UN treaty on genocide—constitute
‘‘a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial,
ethnic, national or religious grounds.’’34 Counter-insurgency, yes; genocide, no.
The COI maintained that, in light of evidence of crimes against humanity and
war crimes, its negative finding on genocide did not detract from the ‘‘gravity of the
crimes perpetrated’’ in Darfur. A constructionist analysis, on the other hand, points
to the likelihood that the ‘‘unlabeling’’ of violence in Darfur will indeed lead to
reduced interest in, coverage of, and action regarding the non-genocide.
In terms of international relations, the fact that two other relevant multinational
organizations (the European Union and the African Union) also explicitly declined
to adopt the genocide label, as did significant UN members (Russia, China, Pakistan),
put the United States in the disadvantageous position of outlier labeler. Yet it was not
only in the community of nations that such disagreements arose. Among human-rights
NGOs, there is a split between those willing to recognize officially that genocide
in Darfur is occurring (e.g., Physicians for Human Rights, International Crisis Group)
and those not willing to do so (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch).35
However justified for tactical reasons, such labeling disharmony within the humanrights community, no less than among the community of nations, tends toward
functional paralysis. Such discrepancy also raises important questions about the
process of ‘‘labeling’’ mass murder as genocide. Until there is a universally constructed
consensus on the applicability of the label among mass publics as well as among
governments and NGOs, concerted anti-genocidal intervention is unlikely. Even then,
as suggested at the beginning of this article, the possibility arises that what
passes the ‘‘G-test’’ at one point in time may fail later, as binary conflict on the
ground spirals into intramural bloodshed. When distinctions between victim and
Table 1: Characterizations of violence in Darfur
‘‘Genocide’’

‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’

No (or not quite) genocide

United States

United Nations (prior to 01/05)

United Nations (as of 01/05)
European Union
African Union
Arab League
Pakistan
Russia
China
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perpetrator groups blur, it is hard to maintain a consensual finding that the violence
still constitutes a genocide.

Elite Print Media Use of ‘‘Genocide’’
Primed to the importance of the media in constructing mass public understanding
of overseas atrocities, Walter Ezell undertook the first quantitative study of newspaper
coverage of genocidal conflict in Africa (Burundi and Mozambique) and Iraq
(Kurdistan). Based on column-inch counts in five leading newspapers, Ezell concludes
that ‘‘events involving great human suffering and loss of life tend to be covered
in spurts’’ and that it is critical to resolve ambiguity early, ‘‘thus allowing onlookers
to decide quickly whether and how to act on the basis of reliable information.’’36
He also acknowledges the power of the reporter in changing (and, indeed, nullifying)
the intended message of an article’s source.
Inspired by Ezell, and in an effort to gauge the penetration of the genocide label
among the newspaper reading public, my research assistant and I tracked
the incidence of the word ‘‘genocide’’ in articles relating to Darfur in (1) the
New York Times and the Washington Post between January and August 2004 and
(2) those same newspapers, plus the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, and
the Financial Times, between September 2004 and March 2005. The results are
plotted in Figures 1 and 2. They do not include editorials or op-ed pieces.
We chose January 2004 as the starting point for newspaper tracking to provide
a measure of change over time from before official US recognition of the crisis as
genocide. Because the New York Times is the US paper of record, its treatment of
a topic is critical; as index of governmental interest in a topic, coverage by
The Washington Post is also key. Figure 1 thus shows the results from those two
elite newspapers on their own.
The Boston Globe and the Los Angeles Times reflect coverage for more local
readerships. Prior to September 2004, their coverage of genocide in Sudan was
quite limited in scope. The same can be said for London’s Financial Times, which
was chosen for tracking to provide a comparative perspective. By March 2005,
the controversy over dueling determinations (US vs. UN) regarding the genocidal
nature of the conflict in Darfur had largely faded from public discussion and memory.
In the first two months of 2004, coverage of Darfur was negligible, with
the government of Sudan taking active steps to ensure that it remained so.37 Some
initial uses of the term ‘‘genocide’’ appeared in articles beginning in March. Spikes
were evident with Colin Powell’s June visit and Congress’s July declaration.
Interestingly, there are significant discrepancies with respect to scope of coverage
and incidence of word usage, with the Washington Post more focused on the
secretary of state’s June visit and the New York Times more fluid with the word
as a result of the Congressional statement.
A significant spike in newspaper usage of ‘‘genocide’’ coincided with Powell’s
own admission in September 2004 that that word does properly characterize violence
in Darfur. Compared with more regional newspapers (Los Angeles Times, Boston
Globe), the Post and the Times maintained a leadership position with respect
to keeping the ‘‘G-word’’ in their regular readers’ vocabulary. This is not surprising,
given their greater overall commitment to international coverage and the
national political dimension that the State Department’s and Congress’s embracing
of the issue assumed. More surprising is the limited response that the United Nations’
null finding generated in US newspapers, as compared with the (relatively late)
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interest of the one European control paper, the Financial Times. (FT invocation of
the word peaked in the two weeks preceding and two weeks following the release of
the UN report.)
This print media use of ‘‘genocide’’ did not necessarily indicate publishers’
or columnists’ official endorsement of the appropriateness of the term; it primarily
reflected the domestic and international debate over its application. (New York
Times columnist Nicholas Kristof ’s Pulitzer-winning series of poignant and pointedly
‘‘pro-G-word use’’ essays, for example, do not figure in the tallies presented here.)
Nonetheless, the very debate over the use of the term by national and international
authorities, as reported by the newspapers, itself preserved the salience of Darfur
as an issue within the (admittedly elite print) readership.
In this context, it is useful to recall Edelman’s reflection on the signs and signifiers
that permeate political language:
Every instance of language and action resonates with the memory, the fear, or the
anticipation of other signifiers, so that there are radiating networks of meaning . . . 38

Whether or not editorialists, columnists, or newscasters deliberately make
the case, to readers, listeners, and viewers, ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur signifies more than
tribal or ethnic warfare in Africa. It conjures (or, in Edelman’s terminology, signifies)
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor. Depending on the citizen’s age,
the term resonates with these other tragedies, thereby placing Darfur (but not, as
we have demonstrated, southern Sudan) in the same moral universe of opprobrium,
or, at least, at a commensurate level of importance.
Journalists and editors for at least one of the elite newspapers—the New York
Times—appear to have been verbally stymied by the COI finding that events in
Darfur do not constitute genocide. With the passage of time, articles dealing with
Darfur came to invoke the ‘‘G-word’’ less consistently. While continuing to provide
factual reports of events in and developments with respect to Sudan, at least until
the Polgreen piece writers and editors preferred to avoid the conceptual issue
surrounding the genocide label: should the ‘‘G-word’’ be used or not? Following
from the previous arguments with respect to labeling theory, political language,
and problem definition, avoidance of the signifying label ‘‘genocide’’ in the media leads
to a downgrading of attention to, and salience of, Darfur among the public at large,
their elected representatives, and policy makers.

Conclusion: Lemkin, Labeling, and Constructionism
Coining of the word ‘‘genocide’’ is attributed to the Polish legal scholar, Holocaust
survivor, and United Nations gadfly Rafael Lemkin. Lemkin is remembered for
his indefatigability in prodding the United Nations to draft a genocide convention
and to have states ratify it. But first he had to get the UN to accept his word for the
purpose of international criminalization. In this respect, it is quite relevant that
Lemkin was originally trained (at the University of Lvov) as a linguist.
Lemkin spent considerable time and energy weighing the respective connotations
of common words that predated his neologism. ‘‘Mass murder,’’ ‘‘barbarity,’’ ‘‘atrocity,’’
‘‘brutality’’—while all evocative of highly odious behavior, these terms failed to capture
the conceptual singularity of the state-organized attempt to exterminate an entire
ethnic, national, or religious group.39 By joining philology to criminal justice, Lemkin
paved the way for a rethinking of the juridical role of state responsibility for foreign
nationals in international law.
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Application of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been highly imperfect. That it was ratified
by the United States only in 1986 (taking another two years for the inclusion
of reservations prior to full passage) indubitably diluted its overall impact on the
international community. Still, the very existence of such a convention reinforces
public acknowledgement of genocide’s special status, not only as a matter of criminal
law but as a moral outrage to humanity.
By helping to construct a social, psychological, and linguistic space for a novel
consciousness of genocide, Lemkin was also a forerunner and practitioner of labeling
theory. Like adherents of constructionism, Lemkin (while himself a jurist) understood
that legislation is an insufficient means of modifying social thought and behavior.
The framing and solution of political problems, international no less than domestic,
require a panoply of tools. Some of these tools are conceptual, others strategic: problem
definition and agenda setting are particularly promising tool sets for activists
frustrated with pure analysis and ‘‘mere’’ polemics. To the question, ‘‘What are the
moral, legal, and political implications of an unheralded US finding of contemporaneous genocide?’’ social science provides multiple answers. The challenge is to
act before genocide itself degenerates into a violence so fractious and multifaceted
that even the most sympathetic of observers—as represented by the frontline
New York Times reporter in the epigraph—are paralyzed with frustration.
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